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Directorate of
Intelligence

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Terrorism Review [REDACTED] b3

8 September 1988

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
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Terrorism Review b3

8 September 1988

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Terrorism Review

8 September 1988

Focus

West Berlin: Threat to International Monetary Fund Conference

Terrorists and radical leftists probably see the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Conference in West Berlin as symbolic of Western imperialism and economic exploitation of the Third World. Approximately 10,000 delegates from 150 nations will begin meetings on 20 September, and the main sessions will be held 27-29 September. West German militants almost certainly will attempt to disrupt the conference; other leftist organizations have planned protest meetings and demonstrations in the city and elsewhere in West Germany.

A number of them—including the Red Army Faction (RAF), Revolutionary Cells (RZ), Red Brigades (RB), and Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB)—may consider the conference a prime target.

Leftist Meetings and Demonstrations

Over 200 leftist organizations in West Germany have been planning a variety of protest actions against the conference since October 1987.

Radical elements almost certainly will continue to launch violent actions to disrupt the conference.

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West German Terrorists

[redacted] indigenous terrorists almost certainly will carry out protest attacks in West Germany because of the symbolic importance of the conference; the groups are, however, much less likely to operate in West Berlin [redacted] West German financial and business leaders and institutions, especially those with operations in the Third World, are the most likely targets because of their symbolic association with the IMF. We judge there also is a significant threat to US interests because of Washington's key role in the IMF and the long history of West German terrorists attacking US-associated targets. We believe subsidiaries of US companies and US military facilities face the greatest risk.

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[redacted] If the RAF hardcore decides to act against the conference, we judge it would carry out a large-scale bombing or an assassination. The RAF might choose to delay operations until after the conference, when security awareness has declined.

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We believe that the RZ and the small, independent "autonomous" groups are also a threat. The RZ has bombed several West German companies for "exploiting" workers in the Third World. One of its most active cells is in West Berlin, where it has been responsible for three shootings, including one murder. The autonomous groups probably will continue to carry out low-level bombing and arson attacks at least into late September. They have claimed responsibility for four attacks in West Berlin and West Germany over the last year to protest activities of the IMF.

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Other Terrorist Groups

Several other West European and international terrorist groups may carry out attacks to coincide with the conference.

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The Japanese Red Army, possibly using the claim names AIIB or Jihad Brigades, could attack the interests of key members of the IMF around the time of the conference. During the Economic Summits in 1986 and 1987, the AIIB claimed several attacks in Jakarta and Rome against US and British interests. Because

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
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these past attacks took place at sites away from the Summit venues, we doubt the group would operate in West Berlin. The AIIB did not carry out an attack against the 1988 Economic Summit in Toronto, and it may see the IMF Conference as an alternative target. b3

Nevertheless, the Abu Nidal organization, other Palestinian groups, and terrorists backed by Middle Eastern state sponsors with embassies in East Berlin have demonstrated the capability to operate in West Germany and Berlin. Such groups may wish to take advantage of the international publicity that would result from striking the conference. b3

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Highlights b3

Significant Developments

Middle East

Egypt

Israel

Grenade Attack in Haifa Injures 25

On 21 August, Palestinian terrorists launched a grenade attack against a crowded pedestrian mall in Haifa, injuring 25 civilians. The Abu Nidal organization (ANO) claimed it conducted the attack in memory of assassinated PLO Western Sector chief Abu Jihad to solidify "armed revolution as the only choice." [REDACTED] the ANO probably was responsible for the incident, carrying it out in order to discredit Arafat and recent moderate statements by PLO leaders. The PLO also issued a belated claim for the Haifa attack, attempting to legitimize the attack by stating that the victims had been Israeli intelligence agents. [REDACTED] b3

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
Latin America

Colombia


Guerrillas Release US Hostages

On 14 August the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group released two US hostages held for more than 10 months.

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Paraguay



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
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Colombia: Growing Insurgent Cooperation

The alliance of Colombia's Marxist guerrilla groups formed last fall has encouraged increased rebel cooperation and improved performance against government security forces. The success of the insurgents' strategy of attacking the economy while conducting a vigorous publicity campaign on the human rights issue underscores their ability to exploit the Barco government's vulnerabilities. b3

The creation of the guerrillas' Simon Bolivar alliance has been followed by larger and more coordinated rebel attacks, suggesting that insurgent cooperation has led to improvements in command and control, logistics, and intelligence capabilities:

- Roughly 10 percent of all insurgent military actions this year have involved more than one rebel faction, an unprecedented level of coordination. Differences over tactics—such as attacks on the oil pipeline, which some rebels had earlier opposed—have apparently been overcome.

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The guerrillas have seized at least 24 towns and killed or wounded about 400 members of the security forces this year—already well over the total for 1987.

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Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinator


The creation of the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinator in October 1987—the first time all Colombian rebel factions have agreed to cooperate under one leadership—marked the culmination of four years of off-and-on negotiations, prompted by Cuban President Castro. Although Castro publicly promoted former Colombian President Betancur's talks with the rebels, which led to a truce with the FARC in 1984, he used the peace talks to urge the major groups to join forces. Shortly after its abortive attack on the Bogota Palace of Justice in late 1985, the M-19—with Castro's help—formed an alliance of groups outside the truce, the National Guerrilla Coordinator. Castro continued to press for nationwide insurgent unity, and his influence was probably crucial in the smaller groups' decision to accept the FARC as the leader of the new Simon Bolivar national alliance. b3

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widely publicized "national dialogue" with Colombian political, church, and labor leaders. Although the other factions [REDACTED] disapproved of Gomez's abduction, they supported M-19's demand for international human rights monitoring as a condition for his release. Gomez, a longtime conservative hardliner, has further bolstered the rebels' credibility by joining their call for a softer government policy toward guerrillas. [REDACTED] b3

Outlook

Although factional differences between alliance members are likely to continue and will even occasionally disrupt insurgent tactical cooperation, the success of the rebels' strategy underscores how vulnerable the government is on the economy and the human rights front. Coordinated attacks on economic targets are already beginning to strain government resources* to protect essential industries in several regions at once. Moreover, the insurgents' ability to inflict greater casualties on government forces, combined with their concerted campaign to discredit the government's human rights record, is likely to make senior officers reluctant to launch aggressive counterinsurgency measures without more vigorous backing by civilian political leaders. [REDACTED] b3

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The growing rebel threat will also complicate the Barco government's antinarcotics efforts. Protection of vital economic facilities is likely to usurp an increasing portion of Bogota's scarce security resources, and logistic problems, particularly the military's lack of mobility, will hinder efforts to maintain antidrug initiatives. Bogota is certain to point to increasing insurgent narcotics involvement, [REDACTED] b3

[REDACTED] M-19 and the ELN have joined the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia in drug production, to support requests for US military assistance. [REDACTED] b3

[REDACTED] b3

Pressing Human Rights Issues

On the political front, all insurgent factions are now focusing primarily on discrediting the government by publicizing charges of human right abuses by the security forces. Allegations made by the rebels' political front party were given weight when they were largely echoed in an Amnesty International report released in April that charged the armed forces with a policy of torture, murder, and disappearance. Coupled with a series of rebel appearances in Europe, the report has constituted a major embarrassment for the government and put Bogota on the defensive on the human rights issue. [REDACTED] b3

The rebels drew still more attention to their human rights agenda through M-19's kidnaping of prominent politician Alvaro Gomez in May, which led to a

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Peru: Arrest of Sendero Luminoso Leader (U)

The capture of a high-ranking Sendero Luminoso (SL) member, Osman Morote, on 12 June has boosted public confidence in the Peruvian Government's counterinsurgency efforts; however, it probably represents only a temporary setback for the Peruvian guerrillas. Morote's arrest is likely to lead to tougher antiterrorism laws in response to public outrage at his 20 July acquittal of the first of several charges pending. SL, meanwhile, is likely to increase its targeting of ruling party and government officials in retaliation for the murder of Morote's lawyer on 28 July. b3



Morote's Role in SL

Despite claims that Morote is second-in-command and the SL's top military strategist, his exact role in the highly secretive organization is unclear:

~~Some speculate that Morote was demoted from his position as military commander of the Huancavelica zone to lead combatants in the northern departments because of frequent clashes with top SL leader Abimael Guzman.~~ b3

- Others claim that Morote was reassigned simply because he was the only commander capable of rallying sufficient forces to establish a new front.
- Still others maintain that Morote is probably a member of SL's politburo or central committee, but not the second-in-command.

In any case, notwithstanding Morote's reputed stature as a strategist, his knowledge of detailed operational plans may be limited because of the group's highly compartmentalized structure. ~~Some speculate that Morote himself refuses to cooperate with authorities and has admitted nothing.~~ b3

Public and Political Reaction

Although the Government of Peru has several criminal cases still pending against Morote, his acquittal on 20 July of terrorist charges dating back to 1984 has provoked a strong public and political reaction that probably will pressure the Congress to strengthen Peru's antiterrorism laws. The press quotes politicians

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and citizens who condemn the acquittal as a "scandal" and a "national disgrace." Most of the outrage is directed against the judicial system and judges who are accused of cowardice for not convicting Morote. Faced with other, better substantiated charges, Morote is not likely to go free in the foreseeable future. Probably in response to public demands, in his 28 July state of the union address, President Garcia proposed three new antiterrorism bills and called on the Congress to approve them within 15 days. Under such pressure, legislators eventually are likely to be accommodating. b3

Retaliation and Revenge

SL responded quickly to Morote's capture. b3 SL retaliated the day after Morote's arrest by killing a Lima police officer. b3 Four soldiers and two civilians were killed allegedly by SL members in Ayacucho on 22 July. b3

SL retaliation may have incited anti-SL elements to seek revenge by killing Morote's lawyer, which could foreshadow a dangerous new escalation in Peru's terrorist conflict. b3 a previously unknown group calling itself the Rodrigo Franco Democratic Command claimed responsibility for

the execution-style murder of Manuel Febres on 28 July; he was a member of the Association of Democratic Attorneys (AAD), which customarily defends SL militants. The group also allegedly threatened two-for-one reprisals for killings of leaders or militants of the ruling party, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA). b3 AAD blames the murder on the APRA leadership, although pro-SL *El Diario* faults the APRA paramilitary. b3

Outlook

SL terrorist activities probably will not be impeded by Morote's arrest, and the group will almost certainly increase its attacks on ruling party and government officials to avenge the death of Morote's lawyer. Since the organization is highly compartmented, the arrest probably did not seriously compromise SL's security. Retaliatory attacks were quickly launched, and the group's terrorist activities have continued unabated since the arrest. Tougher counterterrorism laws may facilitate prosecution of terrorists but will not improve Peru's ability to capture them. b3 b3

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
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French Caribbean Departments: Proindependence Terrorism

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Even though Guadeloupe's largest independence movement has adopted more moderate tactics—in part as a result of French security measures—and the island's Communist Party is now espousing independence, the French Caribbean's economic reliance on Paris probably will preclude separatists from making major electoral gains. In our view, the decision of the violence-prone Union of Guadeloupe (UPLG) to participate in local elections stems at least partly from the French crackdown on proindependence terrorism. We believe that the more mainstream Communist Party of Guadeloupe—which has performed well in local contests—will capture much of the UPLG's potential electoral support by paying lipservice to the separatist cause. In turn, the probable failure of the UPLG's electoral strategy eventually could lead movement activists to resort to violence. The independence movements in French Guiana and Martinique, meanwhile, are likely to remain largely ineffective in generating meaningful popular support for their cause. b3

The Libyan Connection



Political Links of French Caribbean Departments to France

French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique—as overseas departments of France since 1946—are integral parts of the French Republic. Martinique and Guadeloupe each send four deputies and two senators to the National Assembly, and French Guiana sends two deputies and one senator. Each department has a General Council made up of one representative elected by popular vote from each canton—42 in Guadeloupe, 45 in Martinique, and 16 in French Guiana. The General Council is responsible for day-to-day management of the departmental budget and for the supervision of key services such as education and health care. b3

The Metropolitan Departments of France in 1972 were combined into 22 regions with an elected Regional Council for each region. Because the three Caribbean departments could not agree on a single council to represent them, each department was designated as a region, and three regional councils were established in 1983. Unlike General Council elections, regional councilors are elected by proportional representation; only those parties receiving at least 5 percent of the vote are apportioned seats. Martinique has 41 regional councilors and Guadeloupe and French Guiana have 31 each. Created as part of the decentralization program of President Mitterrand, the regional councils have many overlapping functions with the general councils, but also are responsible for long-range planning in such areas as housing and public works. b3

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French Overseas Departments In the Caribbean



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historically was harsher and less competent than in neighboring Martinique. Moreover, metropolitan French still dominate the local business community to a greater degree than in Martinique.

Mixed ProIndependence Climate

Popular support for the independence movement has long been ambivalent in the three Caribbean departments. [REDACTED] the vast majority of French Antilleans and Guianese have opposed breaking with France, largely because of the generous economic benefits accruing from French nationality. In addition to providing its Caribbean departments with generous budgetary assistance and jobs, Paris protects its departments' economies through special import taxes and subsidies on agricultural products and monopolies for many imported French products. Many French Caribbeanists, nonetheless, resent their dependence on the metropole and have fiercely protected their cultural identity. Local political parties calling for greater political autonomy rather than independence—a position advanced under French President Mitterrand's political decentralization program launched in the early 1980's—have fared well at the polls. [REDACTED]

Guadeloupe

Support for independence appears to be strongest in Guadeloupe. Resentment of the French runs especially strong, partly because colonial rule on the island

[REDACTED] many political leaders are apprehensive about France's expected full integration into a unified European common market by 1992. Integration would abolish many trade protections now enjoyed by French Caribbean producers. Leftist political leaders, in particular, oppose integration, claiming it at least temporarily would ruin local economies and encourage an influx of foreign investors, who would undermine the region's distinct cultural identity. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the UPLG, the island's largest legal separatist movement with an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 supporters, has been trying to portray itself as the movement's standard bearer. The UPLG, in a major policy shift, recently announced that it would contest local elections rather than abstain from all polling. Meanwhile, the local Communist Party also shifted ground when it announced in March that it favors gradual movement toward independence. The Communists control several key mayoralties, recently won a seat in the National Assembly, and, with the Socialists, control Guadeloupe's local councils. [REDACTED]

Evolving Guadeloupean Politics. [REDACTED] the UPLG's new electoral stance reflects a hope for greater legitimacy and a realization that violence is a less viable option in view of heightened French security measures. [REDACTED]

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The UPLG's credible showing in winning 12 percent of the vote in its first electoral contest—a local byelection last October—apparently has convinced most of the organization's leaders of the wisdom of the new electoral strategy. [REDACTED]

UPLG officials reportedly hope to enhance their party's chances by emphasizing local economic issues, exploiting their ties to labor and youth, and cooperating more closely with local Communists. [REDACTED]

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For their part, a significant number of Guadeloupean Communists remain lukewarm about pursuing independence. [REDACTED]

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Prospects seem dim for a genuine alliance between the UPLG and the Communists. [REDACTED]

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the Communist Party's secretary general implied that only his organization is competent enough to usher in independence. [REDACTED]

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Competition between the Communists and the UPLG probably will grow as both groups try to appeal to youth and organized labor in the upcoming elections. [REDACTED]

Martinique

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The independence movement on Martinique has failed to garner as much popular support as in Guadeloupe. The relatively more benevolent history of colonial rule and the existence of an influential local business class probably have been largely responsible. In addition, the indigencus socialist movement, the Progressive Martiniquais Party, apparently has preempted potential support for independence. The party—led by Aime Césaire—is the most influential on the island and advocates greater political autonomy to counter what it views as Martinique's growing economic and social assimilation into France. [REDACTED]

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Two radical separatist leaders have been elected to the General Council in recent years, but none of the island's extreme independence movements has been able to win the 5 percent of the vote needed for representation on the Regional Council. [REDACTED]

French Guiana

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Support for independence is weakest in French Guiana, which depends heavily on Paris to fund the department's second largest employer—the Kourou Space Center. The Socialists, who currently oppose independence, control the local councils and the mayoralty of the capital. Although proindependence groups won three seats in the Regional Council in 1983, they did not gain the 5-percent vote share necessary for representation on the council elected in 1986. [REDACTED]

Outlook

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Major Proindependence Terrorist Incidents, January 1986-Present

March 1986. Anti-French violence in Martinique and Guadeloupe disrupts Regional Council and National Assembly elections; some persons injured.

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January-February 1987. Series of gasoline bombs, directed largely at vehicles of French officials, explode in Guadeloupe following arrest of UPLG activist.

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August 1987. Bomb explodes outside government building in Martinique; one person injured.

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January 1988. Property of French officials and private citizens bombed in Guadeloupe. Attacks coincide with questioning of ARC leader in Paris.

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April 1988. Armed men destroy control room of French Overseas Television in Martinique before televised French presidential debate.

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Chronology of Terrorism—1988

Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists or the use of terrorist tactics. These events have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.

July

[REDACTED]

20 July

Spain: Two Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) members sentenced to 79 and 53 years for car bomb murder of policeman in San Sebastian in 1984 and shooting death of butcher in Hernani in 1983. The two were also found guilty of a series of bombings in the region.

August

[REDACTED]

Gaza Strip: Deaths of three Arab laborers spark renewed violence in Gaza. The three were asleep in their hut when arsonists set it afire, killing two instantly and injuring the third, who died several days later.

11 August

Chile: Bombs explode at paper factory, bank, and national institute in Santiago, causing minor damage. Two other explosions took place in Valparaiso at a mortgage company and near an intersection; flags of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left placed near fake package bombs were found at the scene.

12 August

Belgium: Two Provisional Irish Republican Army members assassinate British soldier stopped at traffic light in Ostend. The soldier's vehicle had distinctive British Rhine Army plates.

South Africa: Limpet mine explodes near post office in Pinetown, near Durban, causing three injuries and considerable damage. No group has claimed responsibility.

Spain: Small bomb detonates outside court building in La Coruna. The type of explosive used indicates the Gallician People's Guerrilla Army was responsible. Police thought they had eradicated the group with the arrest of 11 members in May.

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13 August

South Africa: Bomb explodes during lunchtime at crowded Hyde Park shopping center in Johannesburg, injuring three persons. A black security guard—himself injured by the blast—tossed a suppression blanket over the device, preventing further bloodshed. This is the first such incident to occur in the white, affluent northern suburbs. The African National Congress (ANC) is suspected. b3

14 August

Italy: Authorities deactivate car bomb outside police station after anonymous phone call warning. The device consisted of an electric timer, three sticks of dynamite, and two containers of liquid gas. The Revolutionary Armed Nuclei claimed responsibility, as did Justice of People, a previously unknown group. b3

15 August

Chile: Six bomb attacks cause considerable damage to public and private buildings in Santiago. There were no injuries and no claims of responsibility. b3

Colombia: In Santander Department, National Liberation Army guerrillas kidnap five geologists employed by coal mining company. The group has not made demands for their release. b3

16 August

El Salvador: Probable members of Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front bomb bus in Quzaltepeque. The privately owned vehicle was parked in a vacant lot. b3

Italy: Bomb damages water pipeline supplying Lana hydrological power plant near Merano in South Tirol. As a result of security checks following the attack, police found 30 sticks of dynamite buried below a mountain cable car pylon in the region. b3

Zimbabwe-Mozambique: Members of Mozambican National Resistance Movement attack village in Mount Darwin, northeastern Zimbabwe, killing six persons. The rebels injured three others, looted properties, and set a few huts on fire. b3

17 August

Greece: Bomb explodes at Greek national tourist office in Iraklion, Crete, destroying ground and first floors of the building. The explosion also damaged nearby buildings. b3

17-18 August

Northern Ireland: Irish National Liberation Army assassinates Protestant shopkeeper in West Belfast, and loyalist gunmen kill Catholic workman at building site in North Belfast. b3

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- 18 August *Spain: Bomb explodes outside bar in Barcelona, injuring three persons and damaging nearby homes and vehicles. The Catalan separatist group Terra Lliure claimed responsibility, stating the bar was a center for drug trafficking.* b3
- 19 August *Spain: ETA attacks in Vergara, Guipuzcoa, Baracaldo, and Vizcaya injure five civil guardsmen.* b3
- 21 August *West Bank: Firebomb thrown at Israeli bus injures three passengers. Palestinians were probably responsible.* b3
Lebanon: Car parked near restaurant in West Beirut explodes, wounding 14 persons and causing heavy property damage. No group has claimed responsibility. b3
Peru: Members of Sendero Luminoso (SL), appearing to be participants in civilian march on police station in Nuevo Progreso, shoot and wound two policemen. The guerrillas, who suffered an unknown number of casualties, b1 b3
Spain: A car packed with 25 kilograms of amonal and 40 kilograms of shrapnel detonates as civil guard vehicle on routine patrol passes, killing two guards and wounding two bystanders in Estella. ETA claimed responsibility. b3
- 22 August *Peru: SL terrorists attack two unidentified towns in Ayacucho Province, killing 46 persons. The victims were murdered because they had not supported the group.* b3
- 23 August *South Africa: Bomb explodes at midday in restaurant in East London, causing more than 25 injuries. On the following day, police found and exploded a limpet mine placed in front of a restaurant in Pretoria. The ANC is believed responsible.* b3
- 24 August *Chile: Bomb explodes in front of Mormon church in Talcahuano, south of Santiago, causing minor property damage. There were no claims of responsibility.* b3
- 25 August *Argentina: Police arrest seven alleged rightwing terrorists in Buenos Aires. Officials also seized an antitank missile, explosives, pistols with silencers, forged US passports, and printing equipment.* b3

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Colombia: Approximately 300 members of the Simon Bolivar National Coordinator attack Salsa, Cordoba Department, killing 12 Army members and civilians. Nine guerrillas were killed during the incident. b3

West Bank: Firebomb attack injures two passengers aboard bus carrying Arab and Jewish workers to Jerusalem. b3

28 August

South Africa: Explosion in Johannesburg takes place on street corner in Craighall Park. There was one injury and no claim of responsibility. b3

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